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OF DEFAMATION AND
DECISIONMAKING: WIEMER v.
RANKIN AND THE ABDICATION OF
APPELLATE RESPONSIBILITY
DALE D. GOBLE*
In March, 1986, Ron Rankin published an article assailing the
competence and integrity of the Kootenai County Prosecutor, Glen
Walker.' The article challenged the propriety of Mr. Walker's practice
of receiving compensation from municipalities for prosecuting their
misdemeanors while also drawing his salary as county prosecutor:
"This moonlighting amounts to conducting a private practice at tax-
payer's expense." The article also accused Mr. Walker of failing to sup-
press the prostitution and gambling that were "rampant" in a small
community near the Idaho-Washington border. These derelictions were
an example of a pattern of misconduct: "As prosecutor, Glen Walker
has used his office as a platform to further his ambitions for higher
office by selectively choosing to prosecute certain high-profile 'smoking
gun' cases, while plea-bargaining away, or failing to file, many other
cases." The failure to prosecute "hundreds of misdemeanors and felo-
nies" was the result of Mr. Walker's "statewide political excursions and
moonlighting."
One case, however, which will not disappear for lack of prose-
cution concerns the death of a 23-year old mother of two, Deb-
bie Weimer [sic] in Post Falls on Saturday, January 11, 1980.
Mrs. Weimer [sic] was shot in the chest at point blank range
with a 44 Magnum revolver, at about midnight. The Post Falls
police responded to the call and Detective Randy Bohn con-
* Professor of Law, University of Idaho. I would like to thank Monique Lillard for
her comments on an earlier draft of this article. The research for this article was par-
tially funded by a University of Idaho College of Law summer research stipend.
1. The article was in Vox Pop, a free newspaper published irregularly by Mr.
Rankin. Record at 8, Wiemer v. Rankin, 117 Idaho 566, 790 P.2d 347 (1990) (Ronald D.
Rankin, Glen Walker: Inept, Indifferent or Incompetent?, Vox Pop, Mar., 1986, at 3); id.
at 3 (Affidavit of Ronald D. Rankin); id. at 74 (Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to
Summary Judgment). For simplicity, the Record and the various appellate briefs will be
cited without the additional citation to the report of the case.
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ducted the investigation. At about 1:30 A.M., Walker and his
staff investigator Merf Stalder (now Kootenai County Sheriff)
arrived. Stalder interviewed the husband of the victim and ob-
served the scene. The husband stated that his wife shot herself.
Walker and Stalder left the scene at approximately 2 A.M.,
with Walker telling Det. Bohn that they would be in touch
with him on Monday and decide where the autopsy would be
conducted. When Bohn, continuing his investigation, contacted
the victim's family on Sunday afternoon, he was informed that
an autopsy had already been performed that morning at 10
A.M. On Wednesday, Bohn was informed by the family that
the body had been released and cremated. The evidence col-
lected by the Post Falls Police Department and by Det. Bohn
indicating that the victim did not shoot herself - and which I
have personally viewed - is overwhelming. It contains photo-
graphs indicating that it was impossible for the victim to have
held the gun in the position needed to shoot herself, a labora-
tory chemical test by the FBI which found no antimony bar-
ium from the gun discharge on the hand swabs taken of the
victim; lint on the gun indicating it had been wiped clean of
fingerprints; a severe wound to the victim's mouth, which
Stalder's report confirmed appeared to have come from a .blow;
and boxes of the victim's clothing and personal effects which
had been packed indicating an intent to leave home . . .and
more. The thoroughness of the Post Falls police investigation
is irrefutable. Bohn, who is now assistant police chief in Post
Falls, has personally taken files of the case to the prosecutor's
office at least once a year since the incident. He states that
each time the files are presented, the current deputy prosecu-
tor has agreed to the merit of the case. Each time the deputy
has said he would discuss it with Walker; each time nothing
further was done.2
Shortly after the article appeared, an attorney for Irvin Wiemer -
Debbie Wiemer's husband - wrote Mr. Rankin demanding a retrac-
tion of the statements concerning Ms. Wiemer's death and an apology.8
When Mr. Rankin refused, Mr. Wiemer filed an action for defamation.
In his Complaint, Mr. Wiemer alleged that Mr. Rankin "intended to
2. Record at 8 (Ronald D. Rankin, Glen Walker: Inept, Indifferent or Incompe-
tent?, Vox Pop, Mar., 1986, at 3).
3. Record at 9 (Letter from J. Ray Cox to Ron Rankin, Mar. 24, 1986). Under
IDAHO CODE § 6-712 (1990), a demand for a retraction is required if an individual seeks
more than actual damages in a subsequent defamation action.
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mean that the Plaintiff was guilty of the murder of his wife, Deborah
K. Wiemer, that he had lied to the authorities when he stated to them
that his wife had shot herself, and that the author RANKIN had re-
viewed irrefutable evidence" that justified the allegations."
In his Answer, Mr. Rankin denied that the publication had de-
famed Mr. Wiemer. He also asserted as affirmative defenses that the
publication was privileged, truthful, a fair comment on a newsworthy
event, and a report of official records.' Following discovery, Mr. Rankin
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion6
and Mr. Wiemer appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court.
The court began its analysis with the allocation of the burden of
proving the truth or falsity of the statements. As the court recognized,
under federal constitutional law the plaintiff bears the burden of prov-
ing the statements are false if the statement discusses a matter of pub-
lic concern - "even when the person alleging defamation is a private
person."7 Since the matter was one of public concern, Mr. Wiemer
4. Record at 5 (Complaint).
5. Record at 15-16 (Answer).
6. Although the district court's opinion hops disjointedly from topic to topic, the
decision appears to rest on three grounds:
1. the communication was constitutionally-protected opinion. This conclusion
was based on two factors: that Mr. Rankin nowhere stated "as a matter of
fact" that Ms. Wiemer had been murdered and that the use of terms such as
"indicated," "irrefutable," and "overwhelming" demonstrated that Mr. Rankin
was offering only his opinion. Record at 206-07, 215-16 (Memorandum
Decision).
2. the article was statutorily privileged as "a fair true report, without malice, of
a. . . public official proceeding." IDAHO CODE § 6-713(4) (1990). Record at 208-
11 (Memorandum Decision).
3. the publication was constitutionally privileged. The court apparently consid-
ered Mr. Wiemer to be an involuntary public figure - an "individual who be-
comes embroiled in a public controversy through no effort of his own." Record
at 212 (Memorandum Decision) (quoting Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 337,
340, 563 P.2d 395, 398 (1977)). As such, the court required Mr. Wiemer to
prove "malice" and concluded that "there is no evidence that shows with con-
vincing clarity that Ronald Rankin acted with the requisite malice in publish-
ing the subject article." Record at 213 (Memorandum Decision). The court
confuses the issue, however, by conflating the United States Supreme Court's
deliberate-or-reckless-falsity standard with common-law malice. Compare id.
at 211 with id. at 213. And the court further confuses the issue by concluding
that - while the article was intended to criticize Mr. Walker rather than Mr.
Wiemer - "the malice required to pursue this action must be directed to the
plaintiff." Id. at 214. The district court's opinion thus can be read as holding
Mr. Wiemer failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Rankin
was motivated by ill will or spite toward him.
7. Wiemer v. Rankin, 117 Idaho 566, 570, 790 P.2d 347, 351 (1990).
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"had the burden of proving that Rankin's statements about Debbie's
death were false." s
This conclusion led the court to the next issue: whether there was
a genuine issue of fact on the falsity of the communication. For the
court, this was a question of whether the article's statements were
"opinion." Acknowledging that it is often difficult to distinguish "fact"
and "opinion," the court adopted a test developed by the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals that focuses on whether "an author represents
that he has private, first-hand knowledge which substantiates the opin-
ion he expresses." If there is such a representation, the author can be
held liable if she fails to disclose "sufficient information upon which
the reader could make an independent judgment. '" The question thus
is whether the statement of opinion implies unrevealed facts. The
court concluded that Mr. Rankin's article failed under this standard
since it stated that there were photographs which demonstrated that it
"was impossible for the victim to have held the gun in the position
needed to shoot herself."" This statement presented "the private,
first-hand knowledge that [is] the mark of defamatory opinion" and
thus was not constitutionally protected opinion. 2
Since the article's statements were not opinions, the court turned
to the underlying question: was summary judgment properly granted
on the falsity of the statements? Noting the police file contained excul-
patory information that Mr. Rankin did not reveal, the court con-
cluded "there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the falsity of
Rankin's statement that the evidence was overwhelming.' 13
The court turned next to Mr. Rankin's affirmative defenses. The
trial court had held that the defendant enjoyed a statutory privilege
for "a fair report, without malice, of a . . . public official proceeding.""
The supreme court reversed since, even if police reports were a "public
official proceeding," Mr. Rankin admitted that he had "relied upon
8. Id. at 570-71, 790 P.2d at 351-52. The court adopts the annoying habit of refer-
ring to Mr. and Ms. Wiemer by their first names and Mr. Rankin by his last name. The
result is a juvenalizing of Irvin and Debbie and of Irvin's suit against Rankin.
9. Id. at 571, 790 P.2d at 352 (quoting Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910,
913 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977)).
10. Id. at 572, 790 P.2d at 353 (quoting Herbert W. Titus, Statement of Fact Ver-
sus Statement of Opinion - A Spurious Dispute in Fair Comment, 15 VAND. L. REv.
1203, 1216 (1962)).
11. Id. at 572, 790 P.2d at 353 (quoting Ronald D. Rankin, Glen Walker: Inept,
Indifferent or Incompetent, Vox Pop, Mar., 1986, at 3).
12. Id. at 572, 790 P.2d at 353.
13. Id. at 573, 790 P.2d at 354.




statements made to him by the investigating officer that went beyond
the reports" and these private statements were not part of an official
proceeding.13
Finally, the court discussed the damage issue. Since Mr. Wiemer
had sought punitive damages, this was a question of whether there was
a genuine issue of fact that Mr. Rankin had acted with deliberate or
reckless falsity. The issue, the court concluded, was whether Mr.
Wiemer had introduced clear and convincing evidence that "the de-
fendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publi-
cation."1 After reviewing both the exculpatory evidence in the police
file and Mr. Rankin's deposition, the court decided that it was "unable
to conclude that Rankin made a deliberate decision not to acquire
knowledge of facts that might confirm the probable falsity of the
charges against Wiemer or that he purposefully avoided the truth.'
17
The court therefore affirmed the trial court's summary judgment on
the presumed and punitive damages but reversed as to damages for
actual harm. 8
15. Wiemer v. Rankin, 117 Idaho at 573, 790 P.2d at 354.
16. Id. at 575, 790 P.2d at 356 (quoting Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Con-
naughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989), quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731
(1968)). The court noted that it was to consider the quantum of proof necessary to sup-
port liability under the substantive standard - here, clear and convincing evidence - in
determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. at 574-75, 790 P.2d at
355-56 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986)).
17. Id. at 577, 790 P.2d at 358.
18. Justice Bistline dissented on the question of presumed and punitive damages,
arguing that the deliberate-or-reckless-falsity standard does not lend itself to summary
disposition because the question of whether Mr. Rankin acted with deliberate or reckless
falsity
is an inquiry into the defendant's state of mind. This inquiry is properly made
by the jury, and not by trial judges through summary judgment proceedings,
and especially, as here, not by appellate judges when reviewing district court
grants of summary judgments. At summary judgment proceedings the plaintiff
need not prove his case, but only needs to sufficiently establish his entitlement
to a jury trial.
Id. at 579, 790 P.2d at 360 (Bistline, J., dissenting). Relying on the Supreme Court's
decision in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, he argued that the issue of a defendant's state of
mind "does not readily lend itself to summary disposition." Id. at 580, 790 P.2d at 361
(quoting Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979)).
While Justice Bistline initially stated that he concurred in all but the court's deci-
sion on the issue of presumed and punitive damages, his dissent is another example of
what his dissents have become, quickly raising a host of unrelated issues: whether Vox
Pop can or ought to be treated as "media" if it is a newsletter rather than a newspaper;
whether "the publication - as to Mr. Wiemer, and as written - was a matter of public
concern," id. at 580, 790 P.2d at 361; whether the choice of language is such a rhetorical
1991-92]
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The supreme court's analysis is unsatisfactory. The difficulty is
not so much that the court reached a wrong result - though some of
its conclusions are open to serious challenge. Rather, the problem is far
more fundamental: the court simply seems to lack a clear understand-
ing of its roles as an appellate court in a judicial system.
Appellate courts have traditionally been thought to have two roles:
decisionmaker and teacher."9 This is simply to say that an appellate
court must focus its attention both on the effect of a decision on the
particular individuals who are parties to the case and on the general
principles that guide the conduct of persons not party to the action.
As decisionmaker, the court is responsible for reviewing the cor-
rectness of trial court decisions. This involves assuring at least minimal
consistency among the various trial courts in the jurisdiction. As
teacher, an appellate court is responsible for specifying decisionmaking
methods, either by example or by explicit statement. This role requires
the court to develop coherent decisionmaking structures, be they prima
facie cases, three-part tests, or the like. It is the role of teacher that
largely defines the unique position of courts in the common-law tradi-
tion. Cases do more than resolve the dispute before the court; appellate
decisions are presumed to have a forward-looking function.
Both of these roles are combined in the most commonly offered
justification for judicial lawmaking: such lawmaking is thought to be
legitimate only when the decisionmaker offers explanations."0 The judi-
cial opinion is both an artifact that describes the resolution of a partic-
ular case and a statement of principles, standards, rules, and policies
arranged in a manner that serves to guide future cases. Leaving aside
questions such as whether rationality can ever fully explain a deci-
sion,2 or whether there are many cases in which there is not one right
overkill as to itself demonstrate recklessness; etc. Justice Bistline does not systematically
consider the host of questions that he raises.
19. The terms are the author's; the view that appellate courts perform dual func-
tions is traditional. See, e.g., PAUL D. CARRINGTON, ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 2-4 (1976);
RoscoE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 1-2 (1941); David P. Leonard, The
Correctness Function of Appellate Decision-Making: Judicial Obligation in an Era of
Fragmentation, 17 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 299 (1984). Cf. Philip B. Kurland, Jurisdiction of
the United States Supreme Court: Time for a Change?, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 616, 618
(1974) (dividing the job into three categories by dividing the decisionmaker into error-
corrector and consistency-maintainer).
20. E.g., Charles D. Breitel, The Lawmakers, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 772-76 (1965).
All judicial decisions at least marginally make law since they at least decide that a given
rule does or does not apply to these facts, and thus incrementally expand the rule.
21. The development of strict liability for activities now considered "ul-
trahazardous" is a good example. The question as initially presented was whether the
activity that caused injury was like a wagon (and thus subject to liability only if negli-
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answer, it is nonetheless quite generally conceded that the court has an
obligation to attempt to state the basis of its decision.2 And its success
or failure in this task is the measure of the quality of the decision and
the decider.
Against this standard, Wiemer v. Rankin is a poor decision. The
court fails to provide a reasoned statement of the structure that it em-
ployed.2 3 Furthermore, the structure that it did employ provides little
guidance for the next defamation case because it is both insufficiently
comprehensive and too case specific.
24
These shortcomings' become apparent upon review of defamation
law. The next sections provide such a review, beginning with Idaho's
common law of defamation as it existed prior to 1964 when the United
States Supreme Court first held that state defamation law was circum-
scribed by the federal Constitution.
gently performed) or like an animal (and thus subject to strict liability). See Booth v.
Rome, W. & O.T.R.R., 35 N.E. 592 (N.Y. 1893); Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476 (1873);
Fletcher v. Rylands, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (Exchequer Chamber 1866), aff'd sub noam. Rylands
v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-H.L 330 (House of Lords 1868); Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 N.Y. 159 (1849).
The fact that the courts flounder and the rationales for the decisions are inconsistent
need not mean that the decisions themselves are incorrect, but only that the court was
unable to specify a reasoned basis for the decisions.
22. A variety of benefits are thought to flow from the obligation to give reasons:
When reasons are announced and can be weighed, the public can have assur-
ance that the correcting process is working. Announcing reasons can also pro-
vide public understanding of how the numerous decisions of the system are
integrated. In a busy court, the reasons are an essential demonstration that the
court did in fact fix its mind on the case at hand. An unreasoned decision has
very little claim to acceptance by the defeated party, and is difficult or impos-
sible to accept as an act reflecting systematic application of legal principles.
Moreover, the necessity of stating reasons not infrequently changes the results
by forcing judges to come to grips with nettlesome facts or issues which their
normal instincts would otherwise cause them to avoid.
PAUL D. CARRINGTON, ET AL., supra note 19, at 10. See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPEL-
LATE COURTS 60 (Approved Draft 1977); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADI-
TION 26-27 (1960); Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1,
13-15 (1979).
23. The effect of similar past failures is to be found in the trial court's decision in
Wiemer. See supra note 6.
24. That next case may again feature Mr. Rankin who has recently been sued by a
civil engineering firm for statements he made in a radio broadcast. See IDAHONIAN (Mos-
cow), Aug. 5, 1991, at 3A, col. 4.
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Although common-law defamation was generally acknowledged to
abound in arcane anomalies and overly-refined distinctions,2" Mr.
Wiemer actually would have faced few problems in vindicating his rep-
utation before 1964. To state a claim for libel under Idaho's common
law, Mr. Wiemer would have been required to allege that (1) a defama-
tory communication (2) about him (3) had been published by Mr.
Rankin to a third party and (4) the communication was either actiona-
ble without proof of special harm or had actually caused harm.
The torts of defamation - libel and slander2 6 - protect an indi-
vidual's interest in her reputation. This is a relational interest: it is the
effect of the communication in leading others to change their relation-
ship with the defamed individual or to withhold some benefit from her
that forms the basis of the tort.2 7 A communication is "defamatory"
when it has the "tendency to lower him in the common estimation of
the citizens. '2 8 Hence, the "fact that the plaintiff himself places an ac-
25. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 111 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter PROSSER) ("It must be confessed at the beginning that
there is a great deal of the law of defamation which makes no sense").
26. Broadly, the distinction between libel and slander is the difference between a
written and a verbal defamation. See generally id. The applicable rules may differ de-
pending upon the classification of the defamation as either libel or slander since written
communications are treated more harshly because writing "implies a deliberate purpose
to do harm, whereas detrimental words are often spoken thoughtlessly or in a passion.
Weight is allowed, also, to the more enduring character and wider vogue of published
statements." Dwyer v. Libert, 30 Idaho 576, 582, 167 P. 651, 652 (1917) (quoting Farley
v. Evening Chronicle Publishing Co., 87 S.W. 565, 568 (Mo. App. 1905)). See also State
v. Sheridan, 14 Idaho 222, 236-37, 93 P. 656, 660-61 (1908).
27. Professor David Anderson has presented the most detailed analysis of the rela-
tional interests potentially injured by a defamatory communication. He concludes that
there are "at least four distinct types of reputational harm": first, the defamation may
interfere with the person's existing relations with others, e.g., her family, friends, or busi-
ness associates may desert her; second, the defamation may interfere with future rela-
tions with others, e.g., people who do not now know the defamed person may be less
willing to associate with her when they do meet her; third, the defamation may destroy a
favorable public image, e.g., a public figure's image may be tarnished; and fourth, the
defamation may create a negative public image, e.g., a person without a current public
image may acquire an unfavorable one. See David Anderson, Reputation, Compensation,
and Proof, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 747, 765-66 (1984).
28. Dwyer v. Libert, 30 Idaho at 583, 167 P. at 652. In the traditional rhetorical
formulation of the standard, the communication must tend to "impeach the honesty,
integrity, virtue, or reputation" of a person and "thereby to expose him to public hatred,
contempt, or ridicule." Id. (quoting REV. CODES § 6737 (currently codified at IDAHO CODE
§ 18-4801 (1987))). Although the statute defines libel for the purposes of establishing
criminal sanctions, the Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly relied upon it in civil libel
actions. See, e.g., Gough v. Tribune-Journal Co., 73 Idaho 173, 178, 249 P.2d 192, 194-95
[Vol. 28
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tionable connotation on the statements does not make such statements
actionable."29
Where the communication is facially defamatory - where, for ex-
ample, it amounts "to a charge which, if true, would subject the party
charged to infamous punishment"30 - it is actionable per se. In evalu-
ating the communication, "the entire article must be read and consid-
ered as a whole in the plain and natural meaning of the words used,
and as a person of ordinary intelligence and perception would under-
stand the article."3 When the language is "plain and unambiguous," it
is a question of law for the court whether the communication is action-
able per se.2 '
Mr. Wiemer alleged that Mr. Rankin's article libeled him by
charging him with murder and with lying to the police to cover up the
crime. Although Mr. Rankin's article did not explicitly state this
charge, Mr. Wiemer contended that this accusation was both what Mr.
Rankin intended and how the communication would be understood by
the reader.3
(1952); Jenness v. Co-Operative Publishing Co., 36 Idaho 697, 701, 213 P. 351, 352
(1923); Carpenter v. Grimes Pass Mining Co., 19 Idaho 384, 389, 114 P. 42, 44 (1911).
29. Bistline v. Eberle, 88 Idaho 473, 478, 401 P.2d 555, 558 (1965). The communica-
tion may, of course, give rise to potential liability under some other theory such as inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 468
P.2d 216 (Cal. 1970). Furthermore, the tort clearly has elements in common with other
emotional distress claims.
30. Dayton v. Drumheller, 32 Idaho 283, 287, 182 P. 102, 103 (1919). A communica-
tion is actionable per se not only when it alleges the commission of an infamous crime,
but also when it asserts that a person lacks such "basic virtues" as truthfulness, Dwyer v.
Libert, 30 Idaho at 582-83, 167 P. at 652, or engages in "any immoral or vicious prac-
tices," Jenness v. Co-Operative Publishing Co., 36 Idaho at 703, 213 P. at 353. See also
Richeson v. Kessler, 73 Idaho 548, 551, 255 P.2d 707, 708 (1953). Cf. Pacific Packing Co.
v. Bradstreet Co., 25 Idaho 696, 139 P. 1007 (1914) (standards applicable to libel of busi-
nesses); Mann v. Bulgin, 34 Idaho 714, 203 P. 463 (1921) (standards applicable to slan-
der); Douglas v. Douglas, 4 Idaho 293, 39 P. 934 (1895) (same).
31. Gough v. Tribune-Journal Co., 73 Idaho at 178, 249 P.2d at 195.
32. Gough v. Tribune-Journal Co., 75 Idaho 502, 508, 275 P.2d 663, 666 (1954);
Bistline v. Eberle, 88 Idaho at 478, 401 P.2d at 558. Idaho's law on libel and slander per
se did not correspond to the general common-law rules on the subject. Compare Gough
v. Tribune-Journal Co., 75 Idaho at 508, 275 P.2d at 666 with PROSSER, supra note 25, at
788-97.
. 33. Mr. Wiemer's complaint provided the following innuendo or statement of how
the language would be read and understood by a reasonable person:
By said words published in the newspaper as aforesaid, Defendant RANKIN
meant and intended to mean that the Plaintiff was guilty of the murder of his
wife, Deborah K. Wiemer, that he had lied to the authorities when he stated to
them that his wife had shot herself, and that the author RANKIN had re-
viewed irrefutable evidence of such claimed facts. Said words so published, and
1991-92]
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Mr. Wiemer's allegations were sufficiently borne out by the article
to warrant submitting the case to the jury. After noting that "[tihe
husband stated that his wife shot herself," Mr. Rankin declared that
"[t]he evidence collected by the Post Falls Police Department and by
Det. Bohn indicating that the victim did not shoot herself - and
which I have personally viewed - is overwhelming." The article then
listed some of the evidence and praised the "thoroughness of the Post
Falls police investigation [which] is irrefutable" before concluding that
several deputy prosecutors have agreed on "the merit of the case. ' '34
The thrust of the article is that the Post Falls Police had an irrefutable
case that Ms. Wiemer was murdered and, but for the incompetence of
Mr. Walker, the case would have been prosecuted. Since it was a case
of murder rather than suicide, Ms. Wiemer's husband - who had told
the police that his wife "shot herself' - was necessarily lying and thus
was the prime suspect. Since the communication would be read by an
ordinary person as making these charges, it is libelous per se.under
Idaho's common law.
Plaintiff next had the burden of proving that the communication
was "of and concerning" him.35 Although Mr. Wiemer was not explic-
itly named in the article, he was the decedent's husband and was re-
ferred to as such in the article. Furthermore, he alleged that "any
reasonable person who read . . . the charges . . .would reasonably
know that the Plaintiff was meant thereby."3 This element does not
present a substantial proof problem since the language can be read as
referring to plaintiff - all that is required to reach the jury on the
issue.
The third element of plaintiff's prima facie case required plaintiff
to prove that defendant published the communication. 7 To "publish"
the context of the article within which said words were published, were gener-
ally read by persons who were readers of said publication, and were understood
by such readers to have such meaning ....
Record at 5 (Complaint). An innuendo is used "where the language of the alleged defa-
mation is vague or ambiguous, and explanatory allegations are required to show the in-
tent of the defendant, and the sense in which the article is understood by its readers."
Gough v. Tribune-Journal Co., 75 Idaho at 508, 275 P.2d at 666. The libel per se rules
apply even if innuendo is required. Dayton v. Drumheller, 32 Idaho 283, 287, 182 P. 102,
103 (1919) (overruled on other grounds by Richeson v. Kessler, 73 Idaho 548, 255 P.2d
707 (1953)).
34. Record at 8 (Ronald D. Rankin, Glen Walker: Inept, Indifferent or Incompe-
tent?, Vox Pop, Mar., 1986, at 3).
35. See Farber v. Cornils, 94 Idaho 326, 328, 487 P.2d 689, 691 (1971).
36. Record at 5 (Complaint). This language is the "colloquium," the allegation that
the communication complained of was "of and concerning" plaintiff.
37. Hemminger v. Tri-State Lumber Co., 57 Idaho 697, 702, 68 P.2d 54, 55 (1937).
[Vol. 28
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a communication is simply "'to make it known to any person other
than the person libeled.' "38 Mr. Rankin acknowledged that he is the
publisher of the allegedly libelous communication."9
The final issue is the measure of damages. At the common law,
plaintiff was not required to plead or prove special damages if the com-
munication was libelous per se. In such cases, substantial damages
were presumed.'0 Furthermore, Mr. Wiemer would have been entitled
to punitive damages upon proof that Mr. Rankin published the com-
munication "maliciously or wantonly.'
4 1
Thus, a jury would have been justified in giving a verdict for Mr.
Wiemer against Mr. Rankin under Idaho's common law of libel. The
statements in Mr. Rankin's article could be understood by a reasonable
reader as charging Mr. Wiemer with murdering his wife and lying to
the police, charges that are libelous per se. Such charges entitle Mr.
Wiemer to substantial damages - unless Mr. Rankin's publication was
privileged.
Common-law privileges fall into three categories: defenses
- most commonly truth - and two classes of true privileges, absolute
and conditional.
The truth of a defamatory communication was a complete defense
to any common-law defamation action. It was a defense rather than
part of plaintiff's prima facie case because, where the communication
"is actionable per se, the falsity of the defamatory words is presumed,
and it is not necessary that the plaintiff shall in the first instance offer
any proof that the words were false."' 2 A plaintiff in a defamation
action
is suing to recover damages for injury to his good name and
reputation, caused by the language uttered by [defendant].
The damage of which [plaintiff] complains does not result from
the falsity of the charges made by [defendant]. The damage to
[plaintiff] is just as great whether the charges were true or
false; hence [plaintiff] is relieved of proving the falsity of the
charges. But the law will not suffer him to recover damages for
38. O'Malley v. Statesman Printing Co., 60 Idaho 326, 333, 91 P.2d 357, 360 (1939)
(quoting Age-Herald Publishing Co. v. Huddleston, 92 So. 193, 197 (Ala. 1921)).
39. Record at 31 (Affidavit of Ronald D. Rankin).
40. Barlow v. International Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 896, 522 P.2d 1102, 1107
(1974); Weeks v. M-P Publications, Inc., 95 Idaho 634, 636, 516 P.2d 193, 195 (1973);
Jenness v. Co-Operative Publishing Co., 36 Idaho 697, 702, 213 P. 351, 353 (1923); Pacific
Packing Co. v. Bradstreet Co., 25 Idaho 696, 702-03, 139 P. 1007, 1009 (1914).
41. Hewett v. Samuels, 46 Idaho 792, 796, 272 P. 703, 703-04 (1928). See also
Dwyer v. Libert, 30 Idaho 576, 586, 167 P. 651, 654 (1917).
42. Mann v. Bulgin, 34 Idaho 714, 718, 203 P. 463, 464 (1921).
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injuries to a reputation which he does not justly deserve to
have. In such case "though there may be damage sufficient ac-
cruing from it, yet, if the fact be true, it is damnum absque
injuria.""3
While the court has been solicitous for publishers," it also has rec-
ognized that truth is inherently a factual question for the jury.45 Such
is the case here. While Mr. Rankin asserted the truth of his publica-
tion,"' the question of whether Mr. Wiemer murdered his wife cannot
be resolved on the pleadings. Mr. Rankin's defense of truth thus would
not have justified the trial court's summary judgment.
Mr. Rankin also asserted two additional common-law privileges:
the communication was privileged as a fair comment on a matter of
public concern and as a report of a public proceeding. 7 The privileges
are conditional rather than absolute because they are based upon the
importance of the interest shared by the publisher and the recipient of
the communication' rather than upon Mr. Rankin's status."9 Since the
43. Id. at 721, 203 P. at 465 (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *125).
44. It is not necessary that every particular of the charge be absolutely true; all
that is required is that the substance or "sting" of the charge be true. The Idaho Su-
preme Court has traditionally adopted a liberal interpretation of this defense, recogniz-
ing that some play must be allowed for the "hyperbole of speech." Weeks v. M-P
Publications, Inc., 95 Idaho at 638, 516 P.2d at 197 (quoting Jenness v. Co-Operative
Publishing Co., 36 Idaho at 702, 213 P. at 353)). For example, plaintiff's employer called
him a "thief" and accused him of stealing "first grade lumber" and selling it. The court
held that plaintiff's admission that he had taken some mill ends sufficiently established
the sting of the accusation. Laughton v. Crawford, 68 Idaho 578, 201 P.2d 96 (1948). See
also Baker v. Burlington Northern, 99 Idaho 688, 587 P.2d 829 (1978); Hemingway v.
Fritz, 96 Idaho 364, 529 P.2d 264 (1974).
45. E.g., Dwyer v. Libert, 30 Idaho 576, 167 P. 651 (1917). This is the most signifi-
cant procedural distinction between a privilege and a defense: a defense will generally
require a trial; a privilege, on the other hand, will often serve as the basis for a summary
judgment.
46. Record at 16 (Answer).
47. Id.
48. See generally Gardner v. Hollifield, 96 Idaho 609, 612-13, 533 P.2d 730, 733-34
(1975); Bistline v. Eberle, 88 Idaho 473, 478, 401 P.2d 555, 558 (1965); Gough v. Tribune-
Journal Co., 75 Idaho 502, 508-09, 275 P.2d 663, 667 (1954).
49. Absolute privileges are based upon the status of the person publishing the al-
legedly defamatory communication. Gardner v. Hollifield, 96 Idaho at 612-13, 533 P.2d
at 733-34. Such privileges reflect the recognition that certain types of governmental pro-
ceedings are so important that those involved must be able to act without fear for their
personal fortunes. Thus the Idaho Constitution provides that no member of the state
legislature shall, "for words uttered in debate in either house, be questioned in any other
place." IDAHO CONST. art. 3, § 7. A similar privilege attaches to participants in judicial
proceedings. Richeson v. Kessler, 73 Idaho 548, 551, 255 P.2d 707, 709 (1952). See also
Overman v. Klein, 103 Idaho 795, 654 P.2d 888 (1982); Carpenter v. Grimes Pass Placer
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privileges are conditional, they give protection from liability only when
they are in fact exercised to further the protected interest. Stated dif-
ferently, conditional privileges are lost when they are abused -
whether by a lack of belief in the truth of the communication, through
"excessive" publication, or otherwise.5 0
In Idaho, the two common-law privileges have been subsumed into
a single statutory privilege. 5' The Idaho Code provides that the publi-
cation in a newspaper of "a fair and true report, without malice, of a
. .. public official proceeding, or of anything said in the course
thereof" is privileged.52 While a strong argument can be made that the
police investigatory reports were not "public" in the sense of being an
"open" proceeding, the Idaho Supreme Court's resolution of this issue
is preferable. The court held that the privilege is inapplicable because
Mr. Rankin relied upon statements made by the investigating officers
that went beyond the police reports.5
3
Had Mr. Wiemer been able to bring his claim under Idaho's com-
mon law of libel, it is likely that he would have prevailed. Mr. Rankin's
statements charging Mr. Wiemer with murdering his wife satisfied the
prima facie case for libel and Mr. Rankin's asserted privileges were ei-
ther inapplicable or would have required a trial because of their signifi-
cantly factual basis. Thus, at a minimum, Mr. Rankin would not have
been entitled to a summary judgment. Furthermore, by allocating the
burden of establishing the truth of the statements to the defendant,
the common law provided a defamed individual with a substantial ad-
vantage in the ambiguous situations that lead to most litigation. Here,
Mining Co., 19 Idaho 384, 114 P. 42 (1911). Since Mr. Rankin was not a participant in
any governmental proceeding, he has no claim to an absolute privilege.
50. See Gough v. Tribune-Journal Co., 75 Idaho at 510, 275 P.2d at 667-68.
51. It is not apparent that the legislature intended to abolish the separate com-
mon-law fair comment and public proceeding privileges when it enacted IDAHO CODE § 6-
713(4) in 1963. Mr. Rankin apparently did not think so for he pled each as a separate
defense. The supreme court - perhaps as a result of the decision of the trial court -
treats the pleadings as raising only the statutory claim. See Wiemer v. Rankin, 117 Idaho
566, 573, 790 P.2d 347, 354 (1990).
52. The section provides in full:
A privileged publication in a newspaper which shall not be considered as
libelous is one made:
(4) By a fair and true report, without malice, of a judicial, legislative or other
public official proceeding, or of anything said in the course thereof, or of a
charge or complaint made by any person to a public official, upon which a
warrant shall have been issued or an arrest made.
IDAHO CODE § 6-713 (1990).
53. Wiemer v. Rankin, 117 Idaho at 573, 790 P.2d at 354.
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for example, Mr. Rankin would have been required to prove that Mr.
Wiemer did in fact murder his wife.
Mr. Wiemer, of course, was not able to bring his claim as a com-
mon-law libel action. In 1964, the United States Supreme Court consti-
tutionalized defamation by holding that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution prohibited a state from
imposing common-law liability on the publishers of all defamatory
communications.4
ii
While the Supreme Court has constitutionalized the law of defa-
mation, defining the contours of the constitutional privilege has proven
problematic. In part, this is a result of the way in which the constitu-
tional privilege operates. Unlike traditional privileges that impose
proof requirements on the defendant, 55 the constitutional privilege im-
poses proof requirements on the plaintiff. For example, at the common
law truth was a defense; under the constitutional privilege, on the
other hand, proof of falsity becomes an element of plaintiff's prima
facie case. A privilege that alters the prima facie case violates the com-
mon law's traditional dichotomy between plaintiff's and defendant's
cases, introducing an element of unfamiliarity and thus uncertainty.
The second source of problems has been the Court's unwillingness
to adhere to a consistent rationale for the privilege. The Court has of-
fered two different types of rationales, one focusing on the communica-
tion and the other on the identity of the plaintiff; in crucial ways, the
two are inconsistent.
The Court grounded the New York Times decision on what it
termed "the central meaning of the First Amendment": a "profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 56 This communication-
content rationale justifies a privilege that extends beyond the facts of
the New York Times case to include communications on any matters
of public concern. At the same time, the Court employs plaintiff-sta-
54. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Prior to New York
Times, libelous speech was treated as beyond the protective reach of the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72
(1942).
55. See, e.g., Bistline v. Eberle, 88 Idaho 473, 478, 401 P.2d 555, 558 (1965).
56. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270, 273.
57. The Court has not been entirely consistent even in its statement of the commu-
nication-content rationale, vacillating between speaker-focused and society-focused for-
mulations. Compare Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 503-04 (1984) ("The
First Amendment presupposes that the freedom to speak one's mind is not only an as-
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tus classifications to trigger the application of the constitutional privi-
lege. The Court has justified this approach by arguing that private
persons are both more vulnerable to defamations and more worthy of
protection than public persons." But a communication-content ration-
ale is not necessarily congruent with a plaintiff-identity rule. The in-
consistency was demonstrated in a defamation action brought by a
private person caught up in a district attorney's anti-pornography cam-
paign. The communication was clearly one of public concern and thus
protected under the speech-content rationale; the plaintiff was equally
clearly not a public figure and the speech thus not protected under the
plaintiff-status rationales." The Court has not as yet effectively re-
solved the tension between these two rationales. The result is an overly
complex classification system that seeks to accommodate both."
The result of nearly thirty years of Supreme Court defamation de-
cisions thus is a varied and sometimes inconsistent tapestry of domi-
nant themes and dead ends, of continuing threads and false starts.
Given this history, a summary is more useful than a chronology. 1
STATUS OF PLAINTIFF: The status of the plaintiff is one of two
threshold criteria that trigger the application of the constitutional
privilege. As such, determining the plaintiffs status is the initial step
in the analysis of any defamation case.
The Court has created two general categories: "public persons"
and "private persons." "Public persons" are either "public officials" or
"public figures." The "public official" designation applies to policy-
pect of individual liberty - and thus a good unto itself - but also is essential to the
common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole") with Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985) ("We have long recognized that
not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance. It is speech on 'matters of public
concern' that is 'at the heart of the First Amendment's protection' "). See generally
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 31-35 (1941); MELVILLE B. NIM-
MER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1.03 (1984).
58. The Court has offered two rationales that were intended to distinguish between
public and private persons. First, private persons are vulnerable to injury because they
lacked ready access to the media to counteract defamatory falsehoods. Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974). Second, private persons are more deserving of
protection because, unlike public persons, they have not "voluntarily exposed themselves
to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood." Id. at 345. Given their greater
vulnerability and merit, the Court concluded that the state interest in protecting private
individuals was entitled to greater weight relative to the constitutional values of free
speech. In subsequent cases, the Court has emphasized the assumption-of-risk rationale.
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 164 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424
U.S. 448, 453 (1976).
59. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).




making officers, "those among the hierarchy of governmental employ-
ees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibil-
ity for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs."62 "Public
figures," on the other hand, are individuals who, although not em-
ployed by a government, nonetheless "have assumed roles of especial
prominence in the affairs of society.""3 Public figures may be either
"general public figures" - individuals who "occupy positions of such
pervasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for
all purposes" - or, more commonly, "contextual public figures" - in-
dividuals who "have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular
public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues
involved."'"
The contextual public figure classification has proven the most
controversial and doctrinally problematic. Since this is the category in
which the speech-content and plaintiff-status rationales are most obvi-
ously joined, the confusion is not surprising. The Court has responded
by adopting increasingly restrictive interpretations. A public contro-
versy, for example, cannot simply be equated with any controversy of
interest to the public: "A private individual is not automatically trans-
formed into a public figure just by becoming involved in or associated
with a matter that attracts public attention." A party in a scandalous
Palm Beach divorce did not become a public figure because the disso-
lution of a marriage is not a "public controversy." 6 Similarly, a sus-
pected Russian spy was a private person because he had not attempted
to influence the outcome of any public controversy. 7 What appears to
62. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). Candidates for such offices are in-
cluded. Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971); Monitor Patriot Co. v.
Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
63. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
64. Id.
65. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979).
66. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976). As the dissent in Firestone
noted, plaintiff's appearances in the press prior to the divorce were frequent enough to
warrant subscribing to a press-clipping service and she held several press conferences
during the course of the divorce proceedings. Id. at 484-85 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Cf.
id. at 454 n.3 (fact that plaintiff held press conferences insufficient to convert her into a
public figure).
67. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. at 166 n.8.
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be required is a preexisting dispute,68 the outcome of which will affect
some segment of the public in a determinable way.69
SPEECH CONTENT CLASSIFICATION: The second threshold criterion
that triggers application of the constitutional privilege is the content of
the speech. The Court reintroduced this criterion in Greenmoss when
it reinterpreted" Gertz as a decision involving "expression on a matter
of undoubted public concern. 7 1 Unfortunately, the Court provided lit-
tle guidance in distinguishing "matters of public concern" from "mat-
ters of purely private concern." The Court's statement - "[w]hether
• . .speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined
[by the expression's] content, form, and context" 2 - amounts to little
more than a requirement that the courts consider everything.
Again, at least part of the difficulty is traceable to the Court's
Greenmoss inconsistent rationales.s The decision begins by noting
that "[1]ike every other case in which this Court has found constitu-
tional limits to state defamation laws, Gertz involved expression on a
68. The defamatory communication cannot itself create the public controversy.
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86
n.13 (1966).
69. See generally Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1296-97
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980).
70. Greenmoss presents a revisionist interpretation of Gertz-indeed, a reinterpre-
tation that stands the earlier decision on its head. Gertz was a reaction to Rosenbloom, a
decision in which a plurality of the Court followed the public-concern rationale to its
logical conclusion: the content of the speech was determinative, the status of the plaintiff
irrelevant. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971). The five other jus-
tices authored four additional opinions embodying widely-divergent positions. In re-
sponse to these divisions, the Gertz decision was an attempt to establish a common
ground that avoided the application of the deliberate-or-reckless-falsity standard to all
communications on matters of public concern. The decision did so reemphasizing the
status of the plaintiff as the crucial element. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 339-48 (1974). As the Court in Firestone subsequently noted, it was the breadth of
the protection accorded by the public-concern standard that led the Court in "Gertz to
eschew a subject-matter test for one focusing upon the character of the defamation
plaintiff." Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 456.
71. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 756 (1985)
(plurality). See also id. at 764 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 774 (White, J.,
concurring).
72. Id. at 761 (quoting Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983)).
73. The Rosenbloom decision might initially appear to offer the closest point of
reference. The discussion of "matters of public concern" in Greenmoss, however, implies
a far narrower concept than does Rosenbloom's discussion of "public or general interest."
In part this is due to the different roles played by the concept(s) in the two decisions. In
Rosenbloom, the term triggered the application of the deliberate-or-reckless-falsity stan-
dard and thus increased First Amendment protection; in Greenmoss, on the other hand,
it is employed to reduce that protection by carving an exception from the more stringent
Gertz rule on damages.
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matter of undoubted public concern." 7' Thus, for example, the Palm
Springs divorce involved matters of "undoubted public concern" -
even though the case did not involve a "public controversy." The
Court's statement appears to support a broad interpretation of the
protection accorded by the public concern requirement. In the same
opinion, however, the plurality emphasizes the political self-governance
rationale of the First Amendment, that assuring an "unfettered in-
terchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people" lies at "the heart of the First Amendment's pro-
tection. '75 It is at least difficult to square the restrictive self-govern-
ance rationale with a juicy Palm Beach divorce.
While the decision thus has a core of ambiguity, at least one point
is apparent: "public concern" is necessarily a broader classification
than "public controversy." Statements on matters of public concern
may discuss an individual who has not become a public figure by being
involved in a public controversy.
LIABILITY AND DAMAGE STANDARDS: By treating plaintiff-status and
speech-content classifications as constitutionally-significant variables,
the Court has created at least three categories:76 public person/public
74. 472 U.S. at 756.
75. Id. at 759 (quoting First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776
(1978), and Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. at 145).
76. Given the definitions of the plaintiff status classifications, it is likely that the
fourth possibility - public person/private concern - is an empty category. First, the
Court has emphasized that "society's interest in the officers of government is not strictly
limited to the formal discharge of official duties." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
at 344. Rather, "[tihe public official rule protects the paramount public interest in a free
flow of information to the people concerning public officials, their servants. To this end,
anything which might touch on an official's fitness for office is relevant." Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964). Given this expansive language, it is unlikely that there
is any topic that lies outside of the protected sphere - though this conclusion is obvi-
ously subject to dispute. This result is even clearer regarding the two types of public
figures. Since general public figures "occupy positions of such pervasive power and influ-
ence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes," Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. at 345, by definition such individuals have no matters of "private concern."
Finally, since contextual public figures are individuals who "have thrust themselves to
the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the
issues involved," id. at 345, they are defined by the public controversy in which they
have become involved. Therefore, any communications relevant to that controversy is
privileged and outside the area defined by the controversy, the individual remains a pri-
vate figure. Thus, the public person/private concern classification appears to be an
empty category.
The Court may have reached the same conclusion: in a recent review of the "two
forces that may reshape the common-law landscape," it did not include the public/pri-




concern, private person/public concern, and private person/private
concern.
Public person/public concern: As originally enunciated in the New
York Times decision, the First and Fourteenth Amendments precluded
application of common-law defamation to public officials:
The constitutional guarantees require . . . a federal rule
that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with "actual malice" -
that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disre-
gard of whether it was false or not.
7 7
This deliberate-or-reckless-falsity standard was subsequently extended
to all "public persons. '1 8
The standard requires "subjective awareness of probable falsity." 79
On occasion the requisite subjective awareness may be proved by ex-
ternal factors. For example, recklessness may be found when "allega-
tions are so inherently improbable that only a reckless man would have
put them into circulation," "where there are obvious reasons to doubt
the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of [her] reports,""s or
when the publisher fails to investigate when the veracity of the infor-
mation has been challenged.8' Nonetheless, the requirement of subjec-
tive awareness is a significant hurdle for plaintiffs: the simple failure to
77. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). As the Court has
acknowledged, the term "actual malice" was a poor choice because it is easily confused
with traditional common-law requirements of spite or ill will. E.g., Masson v. New
Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2429-30 (1991).
78. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concur-
ring). See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 336 n.7.
79. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 334 n.6. "The standard is a subjective
one - there must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant
actually had a 'high degree of awareness of ... probable falsity.'" Harte-Hanks Com-
munications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989) (quoting Garrison v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. at 74). That is, "[tihere must be sufficient evidence to permit the
conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his
publication." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
80. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. at 732. See also Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S.
153, 160 (1979) ("[Plroof of the necessary state of mind could be in the form of objective
circumstances from which the ultimate fact could be inferred.").
81. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. at 683-84; Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. at 157-58 (plurality); id. at 169-70 (Warren, C.J., con-
curring); id. at 173 (Brennan, J., with White, J., dissenting).
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investigate allegations is, in itself, insufficient even when a reasonable
person would have done so.88
In addition to altering the substantive liability standard, the Court
increased the quantum of proof required to establish that substantive
standard: plaintiff must provide clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant violated the deliberate-or-reckless-falsity standard."3
Thus, to recover damages a public person must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant was subjectively aware that the
communication was probably false. If plaintiff is able to meet this sub-
stantial burden, she may obtain actual, presumed, and punitive
damages.
Private person/public concern: In Gertz, the Court concluded that
the balance struck in the New York Times decision between the state
interest in compensating individuals for harm inflicted by defamatory
falsehoods and the constitutional value of uninhibited debate was in-
appropriate when the individual was a private rather than a public
person. Instead of extending the deliberate-or-reckless-falsity standard
to private persons, the Court held, "so long as they do not impose lia-
bility without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropri-
ate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory
falsehood. '8
4
The negligence-minimum state-choice standard applies, however,
only to "compensation for actual injury.""8 While states may permit
recovery of presumed or punitive damages, they may do so only when
liability is based on the more stringent deliberate-or-reckless-falsity
standard."8 While the Court declined to define "actual injury," it noted
that it "is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the more custom-
ary types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood include im-
pairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal
humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering."8 "
82. See, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. at 732; Beckley Newspapers Corp.
v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 84-85 (1967) (per curiam).
83. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964). See also Phila-
delphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 773 (1986); Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 500, 511 (1980); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342
(1974).
84. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S at 347. This rule applies at least "where
... the substance of the defamatory statement 'makes substantial danger to reputation
apparent.'" Id. at 348. The Court did not address the quantum of proof applicable to
this standard. The logic of the decision, however, suggests that it also is a question of
state law.
85. Id. at 349.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 350.
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Private person/private concern: Until the Greenmoss reinterpre-
tation of Gertz, it was generally assumed that the negligence-minimum
state-choice standard applied to all private-person defamation actions.
Since the Court in Greenmoss decided only that presumed and puni-
tive damages could be awarded on a showing of less than deliberate-or-
reckless falsity, the applicable liability standard remains an open ques-
tion." The holding - as well as the opinion's underlying philosophy -
suggests that the states are free to apply the common law's strict liabil-
ity standards. Nonetheless, a subsequent statement hedges on the is-
sue: "When the speech is of exclusively private concern and the
plaintiff is a private figure, as in Dun & Bradstreet, the constitutional
requirements do not necessarily force any changes in at least some of
the features of the common-law landscape." '
TRUTH/FALSITY: Issues of truth and falsity have a long history in
defamation. Two different issues have developed in the context of the
constitutional privilege: the burden of persuasion and the factual vs.
non-factual dichotomy.
Burden of Persuasion: At the common law, truth was a defense.
As the Court recognized in the New York Times decision, a rule re-
quiring the speaker to guarantee the truth of the statements leads to
self-censorship because of the difficulty or cost of proving truth.90
Public persons: In New York Times, the Court held that a public
official could recover damages only if she could prove that the defama-
tory statement was made "with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."9 Thus, prior to
Hepps, it was clear that public persons were required to prove "a false
publication attended by some degree of culpability on the part of the
publisher. '92 The decision in Hepps, however, confused the question
by introducing a media/non-media dichotomy.93 It remains uncertain if
the dichotomy is applicable to the public-person category of plaintiffs.
88. "In light of the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of
public concern, we hold that the state interest adequately supports awards of presumed
and punitive damages - even absent a showing of [deliberate or reckless falsity]." Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985).
89. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1980). The oracle at
Delphi could not have done better.
90. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278-79 (1964).
91. Id. at 279-80.
92. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176 (1979). See also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (plaintiff required to prove "that the utterance was false").
93. The addition of the caveat on media defendants runs counter to the majority in
Greenmoss. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 773
(White, J., concurring); id. at 784 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, Blackmun, & Stevens, JJ.,
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Private person/public concern: This category was involved in
Hepps. The Court decided that a private person defamed by a commu-
nication on a matter of public concern is required to prove that the
communication was false - at least "when a plaintiff seeks damages
against a media defendant. '94
Private person/private concern: The Court has offered no guid-
ance on the applicability of the Constitution to this plaintiff/speech
category.
Factual vs. non-factual statements: The original source of the
constitutional protection for non-factual statements is a passage in
Gertz:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false
idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for
its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries, but on
the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional
value in false statements of fact9 5
This passage created the impression that opinion was constitutionally
privileged and prompted an extended debate on the distinction be-
tween opinion and fact.96 In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,97 how-
ever, the Court refused to create a separate constitutional privilege for
opinion. A privilege for opinion would ignore "the fact that expressions
of 'opinion' may often imply an assertion of objective fact."99 Further-
more, such a privilege is unnecessary because "the 'breathing space"'
which '"freedoms of expression require in order to survive . . . ' is
adequately secured by existing constitutional doctrine without the cre-
ation of an artificial dichotomy between 'opinion' and fact."99 While
the Court rejected the terminology of the prior law, its holding - that
dissenting). See also First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (the "in-
herent worth of the speech ... does not depend upon the identity of its source").
94. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986).
95. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974).
96. See most notably Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). The impression that the passage was intended to
protect opinion was reinforced by a handful of decisions in which the Court either cited
the Gertz language with approval, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485,
503-04 (1984), or held that opinion-type communications were protected; e.g., Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Ass'n
of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n
v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
97. 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
98. Id. at 2705.
99. 110 S. Ct. at 2706 (quoting Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S.
767, 772 (1986), quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964)).
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a separate privilege is unnecessary because "opinion" is appropriately
protected under other doctrines when it is "non-factual" - actually
endorsed the essential elements of that law.'0
The Court based its conclusion on the argument that there are two
distinguishable types of non-factual statements that are entitled to
constitutional protection. The first type of protected opinion is "a
statement of opinion relating to matters of public concern which does
not contain a provably false factual connotation."10' Such statements
"will receive full constitutional protection" under the requirement
"that a statement on matters of public concern must be provable as
false before there can be liability under state defamation law."'0 2 The
second type of opinion, "imaginative expression" and "rhetorical hy-
perbole," is protected when the statements "cannot 'reasonably [be]
interpreted as stating actual facts' about an individual.'1 0 3
Thus, communications not provably false, including statements of
imaginative expression, hyperbole, and caricature, are immune from li-
ability under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The terminology
may have changed but the substance of the law did not.'0 4
JUDGE/JURY ROLES: Finally, the constitutionalization of defamation
has affected the relationship between judge and jury. As is often the
case, however, the Supreme Court has precedent that supports both
sides of any debate on the proper role of an appellate court reviewing a
summary judgment on the issue of deliberate-or-reckless-falsity. On
the one hand, the Court has repeatedly undertaken "an independent
examination of the whole record" to determine that the "judgment
does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expres-
sion""'° and has emphasized the importance of independent judicial re-
100. The two privileges are not coextensive. Under the Gertz rationale, all opinion
is protected. Under Milkovich, only two categories of nonfactual statements are pro-
tected. Thus, -opinions about private individuals on matters not of public concern might
be protected under Gertz but not under Milkovich. The distinction, however, may ulti-
mately be empty given common-law doctrines protecting expressions of opinion.
101. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. at 2706.
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)).
104. The Court's most recent defamation decision also relies upon the burden of
proving falsity to dispose of doctrinal questions. In Masson v. New Yorker Magazine,
Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991), the Court held that article containing material within quota-
tion marks that was not precisely a quotation could be defamatory if the sting of the
"quotation" was defamatory.
105. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964). See, e.g., Greenbelt
Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U.S. 727 (1968); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967) (per curiam);
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 156 (1967).
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view and need to evaluate summary judgment motions in light of the
quantum of proof required by the substantive standard.106 On the
other hand, the Court also has cautioned against too-ready granting of
summary judgments: "[c]onsidering the nuances of the issues raised,"
the proof of the deliberate-or-reckless-falsity standard "does not read-
ily lend itself to summary disposition" since it "calls a defendant's
state of mind into question. '1 0 7
The constitutional privileges thus have significantly - albeit un-
certainly - altered the common law of defamation. Despite the linger-
ing uncertainty, however, it is possible to set out a prima facie case for
at least two of the three plaintiff/speech categories.
When the plaintiff is a public person and the communication is on
a matter of public concern, plaintiff may recover actual, presumed, and
punitive damages if she proves by clear and convincing evidence that
(1) a false, (2) factual, and (3) defamatory communication (4) "of and
concerning" her (5) was published by the defendant (6) who knew that
the communication was untrue or published it with reckless disregard
for its truth or falsity. 0 8
When the plaintiff is a private person and the communication is
on a matter of public concern, she may recover actual damages if she
proves that (1) a false, (2) factual, and (3) defamatory communication
(4) "of and concerning" her (5) was published by the defendant (6)
who was at least negligent in determining the truth of the communica-
tion - the precise degree of fault being a question of state law. If the
plaintiff seeks presumed and punitive damages, she is required to es-
tablish by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with
deliberate or reckless falsity - the degree of culpability associated
with the public person status.
Finally, the Court has provided only limited guidance on the stan-
dards that are applicable when the plaintiff is a private person and the
communication is on a matter of purely private concern. In Greenmoss,
106. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1985); Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 511 (1984). The Court has justified heightened
review by pointing to the special nature of First Amendment values: "Judges, as exposi-
tors of the Constitution, must independently decide whether the evidence in the record
is sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any judgment
that is not supported by clear and convincing proof of [deliberate or reckless falsity]."
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. at 511. The Court also has emphasized
the need to evaluate summary judgment motions in light of the quantum of proof re-
quired by the substantive standard. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 254
(on a motion for summary judgment, "the judge must view the evidence presented
through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden").
107. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979).
108. Cf. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 199-200 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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the Court announced only that the states were free to require a plain-
tiff to prove less than deliberate or reckless falsity to obtain presumed
and punitive damages. While the opinion's highly restrictive view of
the First Amendment suggests that the states might have the power to
use traditional common-law standards in this plaintiff/speech category,
the Court retreated into delphic language. As a result, the prima facie
case for this category is uncertain.
Against this background, it is finally possible to assess the Idaho
Supreme Court's decision in Wiemer.
iii
The Idaho Supreme Court's most obvious shortcoming in Wiemer
v. Rankin is its lack of direction: the court seems to have no under-
standing of how to decide a defamation case. The failure to set out a
decisional structure leads the court to begin at the wrong point. As a
result, the structure that does emerge from the opinion is disjointed.
As the previous section demonstrated, the threshold issues in any
defamation action are the plaintiff-status and speech-content classifi-
cations. Any analysis of a defamation action should begin with a deter-
mination of these two issues because they determine the elements of
the plaintiff's prima facie case - the liability standard, the quantum
of proof required, and the types of damage available - as well as the
defenses and privileges the defendant may assert. The court did decide
these issues. It did so, however, not in the context of determining the
prima facie case but rather in the process of determining which party
bore the burden of persuasion on truth or falsity. The plaintiff-status
and speech-content classifications do determine this question. By
treating the allocation of the burden of persuasion as the primary is-
sue, however, the court failed to recognize - or at least failed to do so
explicitly - the more fundamental role played by the plaintiff-status
and speech-content classifications.
This is more than a question of style, more than a preference for
one format of judicial decisionmaking over another. By failing clearly
to acknowledge that the status and content classifications determine
the entire structure of the defamation action, the court failed both as
decisionmaker and as teacher.
The court's failure to be explicit about the analytical scheme led
- or at least contributed - to an incorrect decision. When, as in
Wiemer, the plaintiff is a private person" 9 and the communication is
109. Mr. Wiemer was a private person because he was neither a public official (he
was not employed by a government) nor a general public figure (he lacked the requisite
celebrity status). He also does not fit within the contextual public figure category since,
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on a matter of public concern,'" plaintiff may recover actual damages
if she proves that (1) a false, (2) factual, and (3) defamatory communi-
cation (4) "of and concerning" her (5) was published by the defendant
(6) who was at least negligent in determining the truth of the commu-
nication - the precise degree of fault being a question of state law. If
the plaintiff seeks presumed and punitive damages, she is required to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant either knew
that the communication was false or published it with reckless disre-
gard for its truth or falsity.
In its opinion, the court did address most of these elements. The
failure to set out an explicit decisional structure, however, necessitates
a search through the opinion. That search reveals that the court did
conclude that Mr. Wiemer was required to prove that the communica-
tion was false,'11 that the communication was defamatory,' 1 2 that it
was "of and concerning" Mr. Wiemer,"3 and that Mr. Rankin had pub-
lished the article. 1 4
The court also discussed the requirement that the communication
be factual. It correctly recognized that "[a]n assertion that cannot be
proved false cannot be held libelous."'1 5 Its application of this stan-
dard, however, is strangely skewed and misses the point. The court fo-
cuses on Mr. Rankin's deposition and on the information contained in
as the court notes, "Even assuming that there may have been public controversy about
Debbie's death and the failure to prosecute Irvin for homicide, there is no indication in
the record here that Irvin thrust himself to the forefront to influence the resolution of
the issues involved." Wiemer v. Rankin, 117 Idaho 566, 570, 790 P.2d 347, 351 (1990).
110. The matter clearly is one of public concern since "[t]he performance of a pub-
lic official is at the heart of the subjects covered by the freedom of speech and the free-
dom of the press protections under the First Amendment." Id. at 570, 790 P.2d at 351.
111. Mr. Rankin's statements were matters of public concern and "[tiherefore, Ir-
vin had the burden of proving that Rankin's statements about Debbie's death were
false." Id. at 571, 790 P.2d at 352.
112. "A statement imputing that a person is guilty of a serious crime such as homi-
cide is defamatory per se." Id. at 570, 790 P.2d at 351. While the United States Supreme
Court has not specifically considered whether common-law "defamatory per se" classifi-
cations can be employed to establish that a communication is defamatory, the Court has
given no indication that they are problematic.
113. "[W]e interpret the article as imputing not only that Irvin lied about Debbie's
committing suicide, but also that he killed Debbie." Id. at 570, 790 P.2d at 351.
114. "In his answer Rankin admitted the publication of the article." Id. at 569, 790
P.2d at 350.
115. Id. at 571, 790 P.2d at 352 (quoting Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910,
913 (1977)). Wiemer was decided before the Supreme Court's decision in Milkovich clari-
fied the proper approach to the fact vs. non-fact dichotomy. As the quote from Hotchner
demonstrates, however, the Milkovich decision altered terminology rather than sub-




the police files. Since there was exculpatory as well as inculpatory evi-
dence in the files, the court concluded that "there was a genuine issue
of material fact as to the falsity of Rankin's statement that the evi-
dence was overwhelming. '' is
The artificiality of the court's analysis of the fact versus non-fact
issue is revealed in this conclusion. The fact versus non-fact issue is
not a question of the publisher's state of mind. The statement that the
evidence is "overwhelming" is a statement of opinion; any attempt to
demonstrate the truth or falsity of such statements quickly leads to
absurdities and, as the court itself noted, it is a question of whether
the defamatory statement is provably false since "[a]n assertion that
cannot be proved false cannot be held libelous." ' The thrust of Mr.
Rankin's article - as the court elsewhere acknowledges - is that Mr.
Wiemer murdered his wife and then lied to the police. This is the un-
derlying factual assertion that must be evaluated as factual or non-
factual."s The implication that someone committed murder and per-
jury are "provably false factual connotation [s]" and are not, therefore,
constitutionally privileged as non-factual. 9
More significantly, the court failed to address the question of the
degree of fault required to recover damages for "actual harm.' 2 0 When
a defamation case involves a private person defamed by a communica-
tion on a matter of public concern, the liability standard varies with
the type of damages sought. When the plaintiff seeks to recover dam-
ages for actual harm, the United States Supreme Court has imposed a
negligence-minimum floor but has allowed each state to determine if
116. Id. at 573, 790 P.2d at 354 (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 571, 790 P.2d at 352 (quoting Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d at
913).
118. For example, as the United States Supreme Court noted in Milkovich, the
issue was whether the statements implied that Milkovich had perjured himself. This con-
notation, the Court concluded, "is sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved
true or false" and therefore was actionable. 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2707 (1990). Cf. Greenbelt
Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) (statements that plaintiff's
negotiating position was "blackmail" was rhetorical hyperbole and thus protected
speech).
119. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. at 2706.
120. The court defined "actual harm" as an amount to compensate plaintiff "for
any injury he may have sustained to his general reputation and good name in his com-
munity" and an amount to compensate plaintiff "for any injury to [her] feelings, includ-
ing personal mortification, humiliation, embarrassment, and loss of society of friends or
relatives." IDAHO JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 920, 2, 4; 117 Idaho at 574, 790 P.2d at 355.
Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) ("actual injury" is "not limited
to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the more customary types of actual harm include impair-




more than negligence will be required; when the plaintiff seeks pre-
sumed and punitive damages, she is required to prove deliberate or
reckless falsity. 2' Mr. Wiemer sought actual as well as presumed and
punitive damages. The case, therefore, necessarily required the Idaho
court to decide the liability standard required to recover actual
damages. 2 '
Although the court seemed to recognize the issue, 23 it failed to
decide it. Despite the fact that Wiemer was remanded for trial on the
actual-harm issue, the court did not determine what liability standard
is applicable in Idaho and thus left the trial court without guidance on
the issue."2 4 This is the type of error that results from the failure to
explicitly state a decisionmaking structure.
121. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S at 347. This rule applies at least where
"the substance of the defamatory statement 'makes substantial danger to reputation ap-
parent.'" Id. at 348. The accusation that a person committed murder is one that falls
within the Gertz rule.
122. While the court did discuss the deliberate-or-reckless-disregard standard, its
discussion of this issue is itself problematic. On the one hand, the majority was insuffi-
ciently sensitive to the possibility that Mr. Rankin, seeking ammunition for his attack on
the prosecutor, approached Ms. Wiemer's death with a preconceived story line and thus
willfully blinded himself to the contrary evidence. Such preconceptions have been
treated as evidence of deliberate or reckless disregard in other defamation cases. In
Gertz, for example, following remand the plaintiff won a substantial compensatory and
punitive damage award. The verdict was affirmed because, as the court noted, the editor
"conceived of a story line, solicited Stang, a writer with a known and unreasonable pro-
pensity to label person or organizations as Communist, to write the article; and after the
article was submitted, made virtually no effort to check the validity of statements that
were defamatory." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527, 539 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983). See also Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Con-
naughton, 491 U.S. 657, 683-84 (1989); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 169-
70 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
Justice Bistline's dissent, on the other hand, makes too much of the fact that Mr.
Walker rather than Mr. Wiemer was the target. This will be the case almost by definition
in most private person/public concern defamation cases. It was, for example, the situa-
tion in Gertz, where the thrust of the defamatory article was an alleged communist con-
spiracy to destroy local police forces. The materials on Mr. Gertz occupied a small
fraction of the article and he figured far less prominently in the "conspiracy" than sev-
eral other individuals. See Alan Stang, Frame-Up: Richard Nuccio and the War on Po-
lice, AM. OPINION, Apr., 1969, at 1. The issue simply is not whether the communication
"targeted" the defamed person.
123. Wiemer v. Rankin, 117 Idaho at 574, 790 P.2d at 355.
124. The court only states ambiguously that Mr. Wiemer "would be entitled to
recover damages for any actual injury he may have sustained without proving actual
malice on Rankin's part." Id. at 574, 790 P.2d at 355. This, of course, merely states the
question. Since the Idaho common law imposed strict liability, e.g., Pacific Packing Co.
v. Bradstreet Co., 25 Idaho 696, 701, 139 P. 1007, 1012 (1914), the court cannot simply
fall back on the prior law. Furthermore, a state court ought not simply reassert the com-
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The court thus failed in its responsibilities as decisionmaker. The
most basic element of the decisionmaking role is the duty to decide
those questions necessary to resolve the dispute. The court did not do
so in Wiemer because it did not decide what liability standard is appli-
cable to Mr. Wiemer's claim for damages from actual harm - a ques-
tion that the district court will necessarily face on remand in this
particular case.
The court's failure as decisionmaker is arguably traceable to its
failure as teacher. As teacher, an appellate court has responsibility to
set out methods of making decisions, either by example or by explicit
statement. The court must consider not only the litigants but also the
general principles that will condition the conduct of persons not party
to the suit. In Wiemer, the court did not provide the necessary guid-
ance; it avoided providing the lower courts with an analytical structure
for deciding defamation cases. The decision offers only sketchy guid-
ance on the proper methodology for deciding defamation actions, on
the elements of plaintiff's prima facie case, on the burdens of proof.
The court simply decided a variety of issues seriatim. Had the court
acknowledged that the plaintiff-status and speech-content classifica-
tions determine the entire prima facie case, it logically would have
been forced to confront that prima facie case and thus would have
been likely to recognize that the liability standard was an open issue.
The failure to begin at the beginning caused the court to end before
the ending.
The court must take its role as teacher seriously. Its decisions nec-
essarily are models for lower courts and the court therefore has an obli-
gation to define the proper decisionmaking method - be it a prima
facie case, a three-part balancing test, or the like12 5 - with sufficient
clarity and breadth that the lower courts will have a decisionmaking
structure to guide them in future cases.
The Wiemer decision fails to provide this structure.
mon law as a "states-rights" reflex. Defamation law was anomalous before the Supreme
Court constitutionalized it and too much has changed to avoid a thoughtful reexamina-
tion of the common-law's doctrines.
125. The court does provide some guidance for the resolution of future cases. In its
analysis of the opinion issue, for example, it fashions a two-step test to determine when
there is a sufficiently factual basis to treat the communication as one of fact rather than
opinion. Wiemer v. Rankin, 117 Idaho at 571-72, 790 P.2d at 352-53.
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